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The Practice of the Circle
Individual, World, Permanence in Ralph Waldo Emerson
Andrea Punzi
 
I. Recognition. Drawing the Circle
1 The  metaphor  of  the  circle  is  here  taken  into  account  as  a  typifying  image  of  the
Emersonian moral. In this paper I shall attempt to provide an explanatory synthesis of
the concept of “circle,” in its acceptation as “the outlined,” “path,” “itinerary.” The circle
will be not investigated as a mere geometrical figure, but as a condition of motion, an
occasion of processuality. It will be presented as a route which unravels itself before the
subject’s eyes and, all the same, from the subject himself, from his status as a thinking
individual up to the projection of his own identity into an historical and cultural inter-
subjective dimension. I propose to show how, starting from the analysis of the Essays, one
can  detect  in  the  Emersonian  production  an  increasingly  stark  change  of  the
philosophical  perspective,  i.e.  a  change  from  the  “naïve”  transcendentalism  of  the
beginnings to a gradually more solid “philosophy of practice,” which will prove decisive
for the birth of the upcoming American Pragmatism. At any rate, the main center of
interest here is the treatment of the ethico-moral themes which, if interpreted in the
light of  our idea of  “circle” and of  its  reiteration,  suggest original  perspectives from
which one might look at the related issues.
2 In the first place, it is necessary to draw the circle. One should not so much set up a
beginning, a starting point as ascertain that there is a route, a trace, which the path of the
subject towards the acquaintance of his own practice must follow and, as we shall see,
traverse and overstep. Emerson writes: “the eye is the first circle; the horizon which it
forms is the second; and throughout nature this primary figure is repeated without end.
It is the highest emule in the cipher of the world.”1
3 What appears immediately clear is the central role played by the figure of the circle,
which even assumed here as the most complete symbol of nature. Each and every thing,
in  the  domain  of  nature,  assumes  the  shape  of  a  circle,  which  is  the  most  perfect
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reference shape with a view to explaining the nuances and the natural (and therefore the
truest) organization of the world. The circle proposes itself as privileged metaphor not
only of the worldly, but also of the human nature, given that “we are all our lifetime
reading the copious sense of this first of forms.”2 Human action itself presents a circular
and  compensatory  character,  and  every  action,  as  Emerson  claims,  expects  to  be
overcome in a perpetual circle of action and reaction, inasmuch as “there is no end in
nature, but every end is a beginning.”3
4 The same life of man is conceived of as a circle which evolves by itself, being construed, as
in the case of the trees, by infinite repetitions of the same form, now always bigger and
more and more inclusive. To draw life amounts to walking ahead in one’s own existence,
advancing one’s own thought into the world, conceiving every action as dynamic and
each concept as progressive and non-finite. The power of the circle displays itself in the
human capacity to accomplish one’s own story, to give things an aspect that is always
new.
5 To draw the circle means to build up, step by step, one’s own future, to give a full-fledged
realization  to  one’s  own  expectations,  by  respecting  the  “circular,”  that  is,  the
metamorphic and continuous, nature of one’s own existence. “Every man is not so much a
workman in the world as he is a suggestion of what he should be. Men walk as prophecies
of the next age.”4
6 From  a  gnoseologic  standpoint,  we  identify  a  perspective  which  is  surely  anti-
metaphysical and anti-dogmatic, provided that there is always a residual of knowledge
before the concept. There is always a second-last truth that keeps us apart from the final
acquisition which is there to come. The infinite progression of the circles draws us to the
truth of the object,  but,  at the same time, distances us from it in its continuous and
perennial evolution. Nothing immutable exists in the human horizon, nor does anything
which has not  already been given,  known and deciphered.  Life  itself  is  the constant
attempt made by man to solve the great enigma of the world, an enigma raised just by the
mystery of the circle. Emerson writes: “There are no fixtures to men, if we appeal to
consciousness. Every man supposes himself not to be fully understood; and if there is any
truth in him, if he rests at last on the divine soul, I see not how it can be otherwise. The
last chambre, the last closet, he must feel was never opened; there is always a residuum
unknown, unanalyzable. That is, every man believes that he has a greater possibility.”5
7 Emerson  states:  “The  one  thing  which  we  seek  with  insatiable  desire  is  to  forget
ourselves, to be surprised out of our propriety, to lose our sempiternal memory and to do
something without knowing how or why; in short to draw a new circle. Nothing great was
ever achieved without enthusiasm. The way of life is wonderful.”6
8 Having drawn the circle and caught sight of the itinerary that consciousness will have to
cope with, it is necessary to perform a decisive act in order to reach a full understanding
of the worth of one’s own actions. It will be necessary, in the end, to undertake the choice
to walk around the circle, to traverse it, to live it up to its conclusion, and then to start
again by renewing, from time to time, the sense of one’s own walking through a path. The
act of choice makes itself in the ability of man to choose the sense of his own actions, by
virtue of the itinerary which he must accomplish in order to realize them. The dimension
of choice is immanent in the nature of things, it proceeds from the visible of the real
world up to the invisible of our moral and existential concepts. The importance of the act
of  choice,  of  the fountainhead of  the itinerary,  is  fundamental  to  understanding the
worth assumed in this context by the human action, by the human doing.
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9 The hermeneutic-creative character of the human doing, also assumes the characters of a
biunivocal relation between Man and his own self. After all, the circle might even be run
along the other way round, and the action which was previously taking place from a first
point  up to a second,  is  now retroflected from the second point  to the first.  Such a
retroflection of man’s view is,  in substance, the affirmation of a vision of the human
existence  which  is  neither  univocal  nor  static,  but  dynamic,  ductile,  ambiguous  and
entangled.
10 Having traced the initial circle, then, one cannot do anything but follow the path of man
throughout the circles of his own existence. One must learn how to live through the
practice of the path, that is to say through the art of always drawing a further circle
beyond the one already traversed. It is the art of recognizing the end of things and their
new beginning. Having drawn the initial circle, we must now take responsibility of the
choice of the undertaken path, a path which sees ahead not one, but multifarious and
infinite roads with respectively different and possible conclusions. It is a matter, then, of
discovering oneself human through the exercise of one’s own Being, so becoming aware
of the fact that “we know the authentic effects of true fire through every one of its
million disguises.”7 Starting from the unveiling of the disguise, the path of the moral
sense of existence gets eventually unraveled.
11 Moreover,  to  walk  through  the  way  of  the  circle  implies  a  further  effort  of self-
knowledge.  The  path  undertaken  by  the  subject  now  delineates  itself  through  the
reflection  upon  nature,  history  and  the  Other.  The  moral  sense  of  existence  firstly
operates on the field of the presence of one’s own self in the world and on the recognition 
of such a self by the multiformity of the other existences.
12 The itinerary of recognition thus unravels through the writing of one’s own history and
of the history of others; a history conceived of as biography, as written composition of
one’s own self. There is a “mind” which is common to all men, Emerson claims, so that
each man, in his singularity, is in communication with it. As a necessary condition of his
own existence, he is integrated since the beginning into a net of relations which define
his historical  existence.  “Man is explicable by the entire by nothing less than all  his
history,”8 in that history – as Emerson understands it, turns out to be the account of all
the works of the mind. The historical sense of actions configures itself as transversal and
diachronic.
13 From the historical dimension of the selves, one can trace a valid path through the circle
of existence, i.e. a path from which one can easily proceed so as to come to a renewed
understanding of the moral sphere of the individual. From one’s history and from the
history of others, in other words, it is possible to detect a trace which proves a path of
recognition of one’s own self. A proportional, mirror relationship between the individual
experience and the communitarian – so to speak – synthesis, gets immediately delineated
(an aspect which will prove mostly recurrent in the last Emersonian production). What
must  emerge from the “active” reading of  history is  the awareness of  the tight  link
between the particular and the universal, the individual and the collective.
14 The rethinking of the heuristic worth of history places itself into the wider context of the
re-evaluation of the present time, against a static, monumental conception of the past. On
this point, Albert L. Von Frank rightly observes: “Emerson shows us that it is just this
arbitrary insistence on othering that makes for the wearisome impertinence of history as
ordinarily received.” Yet to Emerson what the human spirit does through its multitude of
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individual agents cannot be alien or other to the observering human spirit. If we are alive,
it must be human life that we live, so that, in consequence, we never watch anything in
history but ourselves.  That we respond at all  comprenhendingly to foreign traits and
fates shows that their ground plan has been in us all long – shows us that, as Emerson
says in his book’s first sentence, “There is one mind common to all individual men.”9
Emerson stresses the worth of the present time not so much as transient instant as past
history brought back to the present Self standing in the ‘here’ and in the ‘today.’ It is a
matter of expanding the thought of each man in the actuality of the whole history, of all
that has been. It is a matter of looking at the current singularity of the subject and of
catching a glimpse of what has been in each single instant of his history in a backwards
process, as if a circle of his own existence should be drawn the other way round.
15 The “chain of affinities” can be run through only by trespassing the limits of particular
knowledge, and this becomes possible by understanding history, in the first place, in its
most active, energetic and actual sense, that is, in the most properly human sense of
existence, where the roots of all the things are to be sought after in the Human itself. The
exquisitely  “humanistic”  perspective  which  comes  to  be  drawn  is  the  signal  of  a
particular way of coping with the problems related to the issue of recognition. It is good –
Emerson suggests – to start back from man in order to solve the “central crux” that
constitutes the complicate interweave of meanings which determines his own Being. This
is not, however, a uniquely ‘existentialist’ (to use a more ‘modern’ word) perspective. We
are faced with an attempt of a ‘continuistic’ view of history, at whose center is placed
man, or, better, Man, in all the nuances of his own being, ranging wide from the problem
of the Self up to the issue of the relationship with the Other. There is a continuity in
history, the author claims, i.e. one of which is possible to have an insight starting by the
chain of affinities mentioned before. Such a chain, in the first place, joins together the
activity and the thought, the thought and the doing, the works with man.
16 The self  of man is therefore inscribed in the works which he has built  over time. In
general,  his own freedom is inscribed into the capability of  doing,  of  building up,  of
connecting,  of  putting things into relations,  in one word,  so to speak, of acting.  Man
himself is inscribed into and writes himself in his own history. He is his own history, he is
all that he has been and his life is his biography. He recognizes himself in history because it
is the book on which all his actions are written, that is, what witnesses his passage in the
world, the trace he leaves behind, his path, his circle. History as biography thus becomes
a privileged tool of recognition, starting from which it is possible to go back up and move
ahead towards a more complete definition of one’s self and of morality. Each and every
man recognizes himself and the others in history, provided that history itself, instead of
becoming  an  “antique”  and  “monumental”  subject,  is  considered  as  a  sign  of  the
“progressive thought,” as a dimension of the time, the latter conceived of as “ebbing sea,”
within which, as Emerson writes, “I feel the eternity of man, the identity of his thought.”
10
17 The sphere of recognition, therefore, configures itself as a necessary condition for the
affirmation of the Self in a context which is not only individual, but also and especially
collective. If it is true that man must recognize himself in his peculiarity as individual, it
is also true, on the other hand, that he must come to terms with the common history, that
is,  with the biography of himself and, all  the same, of the others.  Again,  recognizing
oneself means to perceive the identity through the changes of form, to draw the circular
line of existence and remain in existence itself with a gesture which proves appropriating
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and  expropriating  at  the  same  time.  The  human  activity  is,  in  the  last  analysis,
“philosophical perception of identity through endless mutations of form”11 and the form
of man “consist in the multitude of his affinities, in the fact that his life is intertwined
with the whole chain of organic and inorganic being.”12 The space of recognition, that is
to say the affirmation of one’s own self for oneself and for the others, places itself on the
threshold between identity and difference, it is a pole wavering between the eternity of
being and the fluidity of the events. All things considered, it could not be otherwise, given
that man himself, with his vital equipment, is “a bundle of relations, a knot of roots.”13 No
origin or unique destination is admitted. The acceptation of the protean dimension of
existence is the condition without which one would not understand the sense of the
circle. Existence revolves around the pole of man which is both center and circumference,
both depth and surface. He is an eye which views the world, he is even the world itself.
His destination is the coincidence with the world, given that “he cannot live without a
world,”14 his world.
 
II. Perception. Walking Through the Circle
18 The  issue  of  the  relationship  between  individual  and  the  world  stands  out  on  the
background of  a  broader discussion bearing on the role of  perception in the ethico-
practical sphere of the individual. In his seminal essay Experience, Emerson copes once
again with some views on the fluid and dynamic character of nature. Having detected in
the necessity of recognition the first point of the path towards a new definition of the self
and of morals, the gaze of the philosopher turns now on the role that perception (that is,
the place of the contact between the subject and the world) assumes within a view of
existence marked by the circularity, the evanescence and instability of all the objects. In
the totality of the things that restlessly “swim and shine,” in the uneasiness which one
feels in acknowledging how things, even those which one keeps tight most, easily flow
through our fingers, in this never stable, perpetually changing condition “our life is not
so much threatened as our perception.”15
19 It is immediately clear that what must be saved is without any doubt perception, that is,
the capacity to link the viewed object to the viewing subject, the touched object with the
subject who touches, the experiencing subject with the experienced world. Perception,
then, really assumes a prominent role in the process of appropriation of one’s own self, to
the extent that it becomes a true cognitive instrument on reality. It even becomes act,
action,  it  acquires a hermeneutical  importance,  so to speak,  given that,  by means of
perception, the subject acts upon the world by interpreting it.16
20 How shall  we connect,  then,  the need for a  stable background where the perceptive
capacity  can  be  set  up  with  an  external  world  which  shows  its  fluidity  and  its
metamorphosis  every  day?  The  issue  can  be  sorted  out  by  proposing  a  new way  of
thinking of the definition of ‘perception.’ The conflict between identity and difference is
not and must not be solved, but it must stay confined at the threshold between the two
states and find a way to preserve the connection between the subject and his world (and
also the world of the others). “Our love of the real draws us to permanence, but health of
body consists in circulation – (again the circle) – and sanity of mind in variety or facility
of association.”17 Furthermore: “we need change of objects.”18
21 The subject gets a grasp of the variety of the world and, within such a variety, he builds
up his own ethical sense through perception, that is, he draws the role – both moral and
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cognitive  in  the  broad sense  –  which  he  takes  on  in  the  set  of  relationships  which
constitute the real. To the dynamicity and circularity of the world must correspond a
respectively dynamic and circular perceptive activity, i.e. one respectful of the variety of
experience and still capable of granting the possibility of knowledge. Through Emerson’s
lines peeps out a definition of “perception” which we may regard as “dynamic,” that is,
one that witnesses the intrinsically changeable nature of the activity of perception. Every
single perceptive act has an heuristic worth, it is a crucial cognitive bearer, it gives sense
to the objects that populate the world. It is a matter of putting the perception of things
“into  practice,”  as  the  author  lucidly  writes:  “There  is  no  adaptation  or  universal
applicability in men, but each has his special talent, and the mastery of successful men
consist in adroitly keeping, themselves where and when that turn shall be oftenest to be
practiced.”19
22 Hence we see Emerson’s re-evaluation of  the ethico-practical  dimension of existence.
Practical life is placed at the center of the attention of the philosopher and becomes the
paradigm of the interpretation of the world. Such a perspective – which we might define
as protopragmatist – is well highlighted by the importance that the concept of ‘practical
life’ assumes in a perspective of definition of knowledge in the first and of morals in the
second place. The theory of knowledge is now addressed towards practice, it is put in the
condition of coming into terms with the reality of the world in its perpetual circulating
and changing activity. Emerson writes: “[…] the practical wisdom infers an indifferency,
from the omnipresence of objection. The whole frame of things preaches indifferency.”20
He goes on by saying “do not craze yourself with thinking, but go about your business
anywhere.  Life  is  not  intellectual  or  critical,  but  sturdy.”21 The  real  challenge  of
perception and therefore of knowledge and of morals is thus that of coming to terms in
the first place with the reality of a world which gives itself to the subject in the truth of
its surface, a surface which is at the same time all its profundity, given that “we live amid
surfaces, and the true art of life is to skate well on them.”22
23 A perception which comes to terms with this world must move, change, draw new lines,
new circles in any possible way, still without reducing itself to a mere instrument for an
empirical knowledge of reality, but becoming at the same time moral perception of the
world. Moral perception must therefore start moving and get down into the world, given
that “everything good is on the highway”23 and not into an archive or in the intimate side
of each individual. Practical life must decline itself for everybody into a practice of the path
, which starts again after being doomed to come to an end. Emerson states: “The great
gifts are not got by analysis. Everything good is on the highway. The middle region of our
being is the temperate zone. We may climb into the thin and cold realm of pure geometry
and lifeness science, or sink into that of sensation. Between these extremes is the equator
of life, of thought, of spirit, of poetry, a narrow belt. Moreover, in popular experience
everything good is on the highway.” 24
24 The practice of path leads man to inhabit the so-called “intermediate world,” which does
not configure itself as kingdom of compromise or of mediation, but rather as a meeting
point for the true and the false, the good and the bad, depth and of surface. The subject,
on his way with his knowledge and morality, draws the circle of existence by following
the  guiding  line  that  runs  through  this  “tight  stripe”  of  world,  where  identity  and
difference live together and are not at odds with each other. Therefore, the space for the
agent becomes broad and fertile, the perceiving subject who offers a “way”25 of looking at
the world through the dynamism of his perceptive act. The knowing subject and his ethics
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in progress find their reason of being only by starting from a conception of the world
which is the outcome of the trustful affirmation of the truth of the surface, a truth which
explicates itself  starting form the truth of  the profound,  and in which “[…] the true
romance which the world exists  to  realize  will  be  the transformation of  genius  into
practical power.”26
 
III. Exercise. The Practice of the Circle
25 The context  of  conduct,  addressed towards the practice of  the human,  realizes  itself
through the accomplishment of the polarity “fate-power.”27 The issue of time, or of the
“spirit of time” is faced by Emerson within a pragmatic discourse, a discourse on conduct,
where it is necessary to “obey the polarity”: “To me however the question of the times
resolved itself into a practical question of the conduct of life. How shall I live? We are
incompetent  to  solve  the  times.  Our  geometry  cannot  span  the  huge  orbits  of  the
prevailing ideas, behold their return and reconcile their opposition. We can only obey our
own polarity. ‘T is fine for us to speculate and elect our course, if we must accept an
irresistible dictation.”28
26 The encounter  between the  dimension of  fate  (or  of  necessity)  and of  power  (or  of
freedom) is  put in terms of  an attempt of  harmonization and compenetration of  the
opposed poles, renouncing though to any temptation of synthesis and of overcoming of
the  dichotomy.  Emerson  traces  a  leitmotif  in  history,  a  recurrence  dictated  by  the
unceasing progress of fatality. It is a matter of facing the cumbersome “mountain of fate,”
of  succeeding  in  the  attempt  to  master  the  “torrential  flows  of  the  tendencies,”  of
managing the circumstances of Nature by being able to understand “what can be done.”
Notably,  the dynamics “fate-power” enlightens the relevance of  the individual  in the
realization of his power through his strength of character and the practical expression of
his own will. The moral aptitude of the individual cannot dispense with his creative will,
from his power, and his freedom coexists with necessity, so contributing to the writing of
the book of Nature, which turns out to be the “book of fate.”
27 Freedom, expressed by power, is therefore a part of fate. It finds its expression in the
faculties of choice and of action. The relationship between man and nature expresses
itself into a dynamics of action-reaction which puts the “practical” perspective at issue
into light. Such a perspective meaningfully emerges in the Emersonian view of morals
and,  in general,  in the remarks on the ethical  attitude of the individual.  Emerson so
highlights  the  importance  of  the  “creative  force”  of  the  individual  (“we  are  like
lawgivers”),  as  the  result  of  the  connection of  thought  and will  in  an ethical  sense.
Thought realizes power and forges life through character and conduct. The concept of
“creative  force”  and  of  will  places  itself  into  an  ethico-practical  dimension  which
characterizes Emerson’s thought in the last part of its development, by offering a possible
solution  to  the  initial  issue  of  the  reconciliation between necessity  and liberty.  The
dialectics fate-power (negative-positive), as it has been previously said, does not end up –
in an “Hegelian fashion” – with an overcoming, but with a compenetration and a positive
permanence  into  the  dimension  of  ambiguity  and  opacity  of  sense.29 Once  again,  as
Emerson writes,  “thought makes people free,” because it actualizes fate and puts our
moral sentiment into being through the creative force and the faculty of action.
28 Man coincides with his will, with his propelling force, with his being moral. Man converts
himself into his own will. He is made ‘human’ by his own choice and by his own practice,
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by his conduct of life. It then becomes evident the central relevance of the concept of
‘will’ in history, conceived of as expression of the realization of power, that is, of what has
not been thought yet, that is, lived, actualized, practised. The ethico-practical dimension
of the human thought affirms itself through the creative action of the will, through the
harmony between fate and power, between necessity and liberty. Still, we have already
recalled how the polarity between fate and power is never resolved into a full synthesis.
“Fate – Emerson writes – implies advancement,” it presupposes an idea of process that
directs  the dynamics  of  realization of  power.  The shift  from “being necessitated” to
“being free” (that is, self-realized) is allowed by the use (that is, by the practice) of will,
still  without  forsaking  –  once  and  for  all  –  the  origin,  the  provenance  of  freedom
eventually conquered.
29 The relationship fate-power is  always biunivocal,  ambivalent,  in  so far  as  “Nature is
intricate,  over-lapped,  interweaved and endless,”30 it  is  an articulated set  of  complex
phenomena which never allows any unambiguous, final resolution. What emerges from
such  a  condition  of  interweave  and  nuances  is  the  meaning  of  the  freedom  of  the
individual as realization and exercise of his own life. The secret of the world – Emerson
claims – is the link event-person, inasmuch as “person makes event, and event person,”31
an event which is therefore always an event of the human. Emerson writes: “The secret of
the world is the tie between person and event. […] But the soul contains the event that
shall befall it; for the event is only the actualization of its thoughts, and what we pray to
ourselves for is always granted. The event is the print of your form. It fits you like your
skin. What each does is proper to him. Events are the children of his body and mind.”32
30 In his finally actualized power, the individual persists in the memory of his origin as
“necessitated being,” he remains anchored in his having been an event of his own liberty,
of his own reality. Fate is not alien to man, just as it is not alien to liberty (power). Destiny
– Emerson claims – lies into man, it is the paradigm of his being there and of his future
being, insofar as “the soul of Fate is our own soul.” Events develop alongside with people,
and fate realizes itself through the practice of life, which so becomes the practice of the
human in his being-true and in his becoming-free.
31 Will makes the “event” of the human and the practice of his own meaning, the conduct of
each individual, notably the thought itself of the human. “The pleasure of life is according
to the man that lives it,”33 given that it is impossible to differentiate the dimension of
existence from that of its daily practice. “A man will see his character emitted in the
events  that  seem to  meet,  but  which  exude  from and  accompany  him.”34 “Events  –
Emerson says – expand with the character,”35 and the man-event and his necessitated
condition emerges from man himself and from his power, his character. The conduct of
life (the everyday practice of life) is the realizational force, in the moral sense, of the
power  of  each  and  every  man.  Emerson  so  points  out  the  creative  (ethic-practical)
dimension of the moral sphere, in so far as it is the will which makes the event, which
makes it truer. History is therefore the everyday outcome of the interaction between
Nature and Thought, it is a “perpetual ride,” an “interplay of balances.”
32 The world is  understood as  a  “flow of  matter  alongside the threads of  thought,”  an
eternal process of actualization of power, and the human being lives this condition of
polarity at its fullest. He is a polar being, made by a “double conscience,” which alternates
the private and the public being in the continuous, circular motion of the practice of life.
Fate – we say it again – urges man to realize his own power through the will.
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33 The  interest  towards  ‘the  daily’  is  strong  in  Emerson,  especially  with  regard  to  the
elaboration of a new ethics based on the return of the ordinary. Alongside the need to
retrieve  a  new space  for  the  moral  perception,  the  American  philosopher  questions
himself on the relationship between time and the human existence, by claiming the right
of the latter to affirm itself in the everyday practice, to “enter the domestic fence.” The
focus on the primacy of the “domestic life” and the subsequent proposal of a suggestive
“philosophy of the household”36 contributes, in Emerson’s thought, to place the emphasis
on those themes bearing on the management of one’s own life in the everyday actions.
34 The “inhabiting,” the activity of taking care of one’s own being, declined into the single
actions which make the day, the insight of the detail which makes our days meaningful,
induces Emerson to acknowledge the seminal importance of a knowledge which always
comes to terms with the daily making of things and events. Against the “mechanization”
and the homologation produced by technique (cf. Works and Days), Emerson proposes a
new “ethics of the day,” an ethics which is able to give back to man his most profound
and primitive being, closer to the flow of the events that surround him. Only in this
fashion a truer understanding of  our being into the world will  become possible.  The
author writes: “The household is the home of the man, as well as of the child. The events
that occur therein are more near and affecting to us than those which are sought in
senates and academies. Domestic events are certainly our affair. […] The subtle spirit of
life must be sought in facts nearer.”37
35 What acquires meaning for knowledge are the values ingrained in their daily practice,
which chases the succession of hours and days, always in constant motion and change.
With the new day, the perspective from which events are viewed undergoes a change,
what was white at first ends up by turning black. The daily exercise constitutes one’s own
way of being and of operating into the world, that is to say the conduct; it implies the
meaning of what we see, feel and touch. “I am not one thing and my expenditure another.
My expenditure is me. That our expenditure and our character are twain, is the vice of
society.”38 Once again, then, Emerson puts emphasis on the heuristic character of the
conduct of life, conceived of as practice of one’s own existence in the daily. He writes
“The great facts are the near ones. The report of the body is to be searched into the
mind.” “The history of your fortunes is written first in your life.”39 The aim is, once again,
that of retrieving a practice of the human in the daily exercise of one’s own life, that of
recovering a lost ethical sense, by declining it into the world through the exercise of its
components. “We owe to man higher succors than food and fire. We owe to man man.”40
36 The importance of the exercise of one’s own self in the daily mostly emerges in relation to
the problem of technique and of its employment. In an essay like Works and Days, Emerson
pays attention to the dynamics occurring between the influence of technique in the life of
individuals and their rediscovery of a truer existential dimension through a rethinking of
one’s  own  daily  life.  The  diffidence  displayed  by  Emerson  towards  mechanization
becomes  immediately  clear  when  he  writes:  “The  human  body  is  the magazine  of
inventions, the patent office, where are the models from which every hint was taken. And
the tools and engines on earth are only extensions of its limbs and senses. […] Machines
can only second, not supply, his unaided senses. The body is a meter.”41
37 The link between the body and the truer dimension of knowledge is one of the key terms
in the Emersonian thought. The difference between the wisdom of technique and the
wisdom of the human body lies in the degree of adhesion to the daily reality, viewed as
the most  congenial  expression of  Nature,  “our daily food.”  The danger embedded in
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technique lies in its power of alienation of the human being; it lies in the capacity of the
machine to expel him from the discourse on reality and to throw him out of himself
towards an improper (mechanized) use of his own being. Emerson writes: “Machinary is
aggressive. The weaver becomes a web, the machinist a machine. If you do not use the
tools, they use you. All tools are in one sense edge-tools, and dangerous. […] The machine
unmakes the man. Now that the machine is so perfect, the engineer is nobody. Every new
step in improving the engine restricts one more act of the engineer – unteaches him.”42
38 The improper use of technique causes man to lose the mastery of his own potency, and
rules  him out  from the  creative  dimension,  distances  him from the  invention, from
strength and character. It becomes necessary, then – as Emerson states – to find another
way, another meter for the worth of man. “But if, with all his arts, he is a felon, we cannot
assume the mechanical skill or chemical resources as the measure of worth.”43
39 The new ethical cipher of man is to be looked for in the value of the day, in the daily
sense of existence. “Tornare all’ordinario prospetta una via di fondazione della validità di
un discorso” (“To go back to the ordinary involves a foundational way to the validity of a
discourse”).44 It is necessary to reinsert man in a broader circle than the one drawn by
technique  and  the  material  powers.  A  circle  that  is  never  transcendent,  but  always
immanent,  inclined to reveal  the primitive dimension of  the human,  wrapped in the
ordinary practice of his own being and doing. A practice which explicates itself in the
value of the “minimal things,” towards a new ethics of the daily. Again, Emerson claims:
“But life is good only when it is magical and musical, a perfect timing and consent, and
when we do not anatomize it. You must treat the days respectfully, you must be a day
yourself,  and  not  interrogate  it  like  a  college  professor.  The  world  is  enigmatical  –
everything said, and everything know or done – and must not be taken literally,  nut
genially.”45
40 The ethics of the daily is always transient, given that the “human life is made up of such
transits.”46 Transits  which take place in the “day” more than in the “works,”  in the
“ordinary” rather than in the “extraordinary.” As Soressi writes: “il gesto più quotidiano,
ordinario e all’apparenza insignificante assume significati più ampi, se assumiamo vedute
più ampie” (“the most daily, ordinary and apparently insignificant act acquires broader
meanings, if we acquire broader views”).47 Life itself is, eventually, a “search for power,” a
search understood as sharing the nature of the world, inasmuch as “the mind that is
parallel with the laws of nature will be in the current of events and strong with their
strength.”48 It is necessary to be “in sympathy with the course of things,”49 in order to
become part  of  the  events  in  history  and also  part  of  their  realization.  In  order  to
“become what one is,”50 as Nietzsche would say, it is necessary to express through the will
all the positive and creative strength embodied in the idea of “power.” This means to
have the chance to realize the thought of one’s own being, to put the primeval condition
of one’s own freedom into action. Emerson invites men to realize their own power, in that
“only  so  can  that  amount  of  vital  force  accumulate  which  can  make  the  step  from
knowing to doing.”51 Only through the use and exercise of the practices of life power and
the  will  can  be  expressed.  Knowledge  and  the  freedom that  comes  from it  advance
through the daily conduct of life, its exercise, its choices, its decisions.
41 Exercising culture means to make it a factor of compensation. “The pest of society is
egotists.”52 He senses the danger ingrained in an unbridled individualism, which would
entail a drastic lost of contact with the world (egotism as “disease of the temperament”).
Exercising culture means to free oneself from “pure power,” it means to accomplish the
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freedom of each and every individual in relation to the set of relationships which shape
the real world. To release the “pure power” means furthermore “a power to see with a
free and disengaged look every object,”53 to understand the sense of the closeness of
individuals to the objects and the subjects inhabiting the world. It means to have the
capacity to measure the “ray of affinity” of men with respect to their fellows.
42 Emerson’s individualism is continuously put into question, by putting the meaning of a
solitary life alongside the life of the community. The individual is not here understood in
an exclusivist sense, but as a part of a broader community, including all the ones who
“[hanno]  bisogno  di  percepirsi  come  riconoscibili”  (“need  to  perceive  themselves  as
recognizable”).54 The  Emersonian  community  indicates  the  direction  towards  the
concrete realization of a specific possibility: that of drawing on a common heritage, in the
first  place linguistic  and,  in the broad sense,  cultural.  As  Soressi  writes,  “Emerson è
consapevole  del  fatto  che  la  solitudine,  l’individualismo,  la  democrazia,  la  libertà,  la
morale sono anche costruzione sociale, o meglio, sono anche costruzione linguistica per
la quale è necessaria una comunità linguistica, ma anche una lunga storia d’interazione
linguistica  e  simbolica  tra  persone”  (“Emerson  is  aware  of  the  fact  that  solitude,
individualism, democracy, freedom, morals are also a social construction or, better, they
are also a linguistic construction in view of which a linguistic community is necessary,
but  they  also  constitute  a  long  story  of  symbolic  and linguistic  interaction  between
people”).55 With regard to this, Emerson writes: “Language is a city to the building of
which every human being brought a stone; yet he is no more to be credited with the
grand result than the acaleph which adds a cell to the coral reef which is the basis of the
continent.”56 Therefore,  the  reference  to  an  inter-subjective  dimension  above  mere
individuals turns out to be of prominent importance in view of an understanding of the
more profound sense of the thought of the American philosopher. There is no realization
of one’s own power without communion of intentions and thought. That is to say, men
are prevented from “practicing” (in the sense which we have seen) their own existence
without being part of that thick and infinite net of cultural relationships which give them
the occasion of “feeling themselves human.”
43 This community, this macro-subject we all belong to, is defined by Emerson as Oversoul,
i.e. a word which, rather than standing for a dimension that transcends the mundane
human experience, expresses the universality of the feeling which lies at the basis of the
recognition and of the reciprocal affirmation. Without such a subject, the realization of
one’s own self in the ethical-practical and cultural sense would be impracticable. The
Oversoul is our “common heart,” our “almighty reality.” Emerson: “The Supreme Critic on
the errors of the past and the present, and the only prophet of that which must be, is that
great nature in which we rest as the earth lies in the soft arms of the atmosphere; that
Unity, that Over-soul, within which we rest as particular being is contained and made one
with all other. […] but the act of seeing and the thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the
subject and the object, are one.”57
44 The determined individuality of each and every man is indissolubly tied to the others
and, all together, they constitute that primeval union of subject and object, of soul and
body, so to speak. Only through the affirmation of such an empathic and inter-subjective
dimension it is possible to pave the way for a new moral, addressed to the achievement of
shared goals and future targets, i.e. a moral always inclined to the realization of whatever
comes about from our daily practice.
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45 Emerson’s  community  is  factual,  historical  and  present.  It  embraces  the  toil  of
conversation, the importance of the social life and the construction of a common cultural
speech. The shift from the individual to the collective lies at the basis of the dynamics of
construction of the Self. For this reason, we see a proportional (also mirror-) relationship
between  individual  experience  and  communitarian  synthesis  drawn  in  Emerson’s
thought.  A “universal  nature” is  available to men,  i.e.  one which gives worth to the
particular and to the single things, still,  not in the sense of a unifying and a-storical
substrate,  but as a common paradigm which validates the conditions for a collective
activity of perceiving and thinking. The sense of Nature, as Emerson claims, stems from
the mind of a single, primeval man, but it grafts itself into History, into the mind of
others, by so extending itself to a community that shares a net of cultural meanings.
46 Thus, Emerson enlightens the ethical quality of the concept of ‘culture’ and that of its
exercise, viewed as cipher of the worth of society, left aside any egotism and sterile and
dumb individualism. In favor of a renewed sense of empathy and of communication, he
puts the accent on the ethical power of education, and he acknowledges the necessity of a
new  pedagogical  practice  which  distances  itself  once  and  for  all  from  the  classical
educational institutions. Furthermore, he reaffirms the primacy of the ethico-practical
dimension in the cultural progress of the individuals, by declining the polarity freedom-
necessity, in the terms of a renewed culture and a new morals, which frees men (starting
from their condition of necessitated beings) from the impasse due to the decadence of
society, dragged apart by the failure of the great monotheistic religions. Emerson fiercely
launches  a  final  attack  against  the  moral  crisis  of  the  society  of  his  own  time,  so
anticipating, in some respect, the Nietzschean attempt of transvaluation of all values.
47 Since the beginning,  Emerson writes,  man has been the bearer of beliefs which have
somehow determined the cultural paradigm of every age, ending up by defining, as in the
case of Christian religion, even the cultural and social directives of an entire community.
Not  by  chance,  “Christianity,  in  the  romantic  ages,  signified  European culture  –  the
grafted or meliorated tree in a crab forest.”58 Religions, then, have in the first place a
historical dimension, so to speak objective, which allows the complementariness between
the  public  and  private  aspect  of  the  human  existence.  “Heaven  always  bears  some
proportion to earth,”59 and the actions of men in history are governed by the set of beliefs
which happen to make part of the daily practice of individuals, i.e. the same beliefs which
affect their moral perception of things.
48 With the crisis of the great monotheistic religions (and of faith in general), we assist to a
“divorce” between religion and morality, in such a way that contemporary society falls
victim to  a  moral  flattening,  which no  longer  finds in  the  religious  and intellectual
experience  a  clear  landmark,  but  falls  victim  of  the  most  blind  conservatism,  of
indifference and of a miserable materialism. The faith in an universe both moral and
intellectual turns out to fade away, and we assist to a consequent crisis of culture in
general. One has the feeling of a detachment from religion, there is mistrust in human
virtue,  and the spreading skepticism towards  the community  is  the  symptom of  the
physiological decadence of the ancient forms of religion.
49 Thence, the central questions in Emerson’s discourse become the following: which future
is there for morals, for culture in general? Which way do human beings have to retrieve
an ethical sense of their own “doing,” i.e. one which coincides with their own thought
and their own power? Again, the author states: “The cure for false theology is mother-
wit. Forget your books and traditions, and obey your moral perceptions at this hour. That
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which is signified by the words “moral” and “spiritual,” is a lasting essence, and, with
whatever illusion is we have loaded them, will certainly bring back the words, age after
age, to their ancient meaning. I know no words that mean so much. In our definitions we
grope after spiritual by describing it as invisible. The true meaning of spiritual is real;
that  law  which  executes  itself,  which  works  without  means,  and  which  cannot  be
conceived as not existing.”60
50 Emerson brings our attention back to the present time, that is, to the transient time, a
time which becomes always different from itself and incessantly returns to the original
form, transfigured though in the flow of the daily events. It is just here, in the ordinary,
and not in the metaphysical aspect of the historical dogma, that the true essence of the
existing, the most profound meaning of the Human lie. Emerson traces in the mundane
perceptive  field  a  new dimension of  the “spiritual,”  able  to  solve  and overcome the
ethical crisis due to the failure of the great moral constructions of the past. In that case,
we have a new moral (and therefore cultural) sense, engendered from the spontaneous
perception of the daily flow of the events, built up through the practice of his own power
and, once again, through the realization of his own will. From “sentimentalism” we pass
to “realism,” so paving the way for a sort of philosophy of action and of practice, that is,
one  able  to  restore  a  renewed  ethical  sense  for  men.  It  turns  out,  then,  that  the
knowledge  of  the  nature  of  things,  of  their  ethical  declension  and  of  their  cultural
significance, takes place through the public force, the force of character and the habit of
conduct.
51 Thus, the new moral perception translates itself into a renewed faith in one’s own poietic
capacity and in his own power, inasmuch as “we are the builders of our fortunes”61 and,
to some extent, of the fortunes of other people, given that “the relations and connections
are not somewhere and sometimes, but everywhere and always.”62 The opinion of the
world is the confession of its character, and the only way to restore the ancient ethical
sense which properly defines man as “moral being” is – as it has already been said – that
of  realizing  life  through the  daily  practice  of  his  own power.  Such a  perspective of
thought declines itself, then, into a new philosophy of praxis, i.e. one that embraces the
exercise of one’s own concepts in order to realize freedom and give substance to one’s
own being-human.
52 The exercise of culture, and the sense of liberation which this entails, allows the deepest
expression of the self, of one’s own power. Alongside Nature, which is “careless of the
individual,” goes the cultural practice, which is properly human and which is the means
of exhibition of the progressive strength of man, of his advancement, of his continuous
metamorphosis. Through the power of education (which is the outcome of the exercise of
culture),  the  individual  realizes  his  ability  to  get  out  of  his  primeval  dimension  as
“necessitated being.” It is a “courageous education,” a new one, far away and different
from the classical schemes of the formative techniques. An education which is, in the first
place, a teaching of the practice of culture, that is to say, an awareness of the active role
of culture in the daily life of the individual. “We shall one day learn to supersede politics
by education.”63
53 In  substance,  what  makes  Emerson’s  stance  somehow close  to  that  of  the  American
Pragmatists is the attention towards the conduct, this viewed as practical realization of
the meaning of one’s own being, always projected into the future as privileged cognitive
dimension. One can adduce as an example some words of the renown father of American
Pragmatism, Charles S.  Peirce: “The rational meaning of every proposition lies in the
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future. How so? The meaning of a proposition is itself a proposition. Indeed, it is no other
than the very proposition of which it is the meaning: it is a translation of it. But of the
myriads of forms into which a proposition may be translated, what is that one which is to
be called its very meaning? It is, according to the pragmaticist, that form in which the
proposition  becomes  applicable  to  human  conduct,  not  in  these  or  those  special
circumstances, nor when one entertains this or that special design, but that form which is
most directly applicable to self-control under every situation, and to every purpose. This
is why he locates the meaning in future time; for future conduct is the only conduct that
is subject to self-control.”64
54 This  sense  of  future  which  validates  our  actions  and  makes  the  meaning  of  our
propositions  true,  is  remarkably  characteristic  of  Emerson’s  thought,  in  that  his
“philosophy of  conduct” is  inclined to represent the way of  realization of  fate in an
ethico-practical  perspective,  which comes  to  terms with the  metamorphosis  and the
infinite motion of the events towards a future horizon, always open and indefinite. As
well as Peirce and James, even Emerson regards the esse in futuro as the only condition for
the realization of the will, that is, as condition of the realization of the expectation, of
power, in a world, of the human.
55 In  order  to  do that,  it  is  necessary to  gain,  as  we have already seen,  a  new “moral
perception,” starting from the truth of the act, conceived of as the expression of one’s
own character.  “[…]  My thinking and speaking want  body or  basis.”65 The corporeal
dimension (once again, an ethical-practical one) of knowledge is well highlighted by the
words  of  the  author,  who  reaffirms  the  absolute  importance  of  a  culture  which  is
accompanied by its exercise, by its practice in the life of man. “Culture opens the sense of
beauty,”66 incites to evolution, to amelioration, to the realization of power. Emerson so
announces the final transformation of all the negative forces in power, in the first place
through the practice of culture as we have understood it. The organic effort of Nature of
climbing and advancing towards the “best  of  the human being” runs parallel  to  the
conduct of the life of each and every individual, viewed as a constant and daily exercise of
experimentation of the self and of the practice of one’s own being.
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9. Albert J. Von Frank (1999), Essays: First Series (1841), in The Cambridge Companion to Ralph Waldo
Emerson, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 107.





15. Ralph W. Emerson (1883), Essays. Second Series, Cambridge, The Riverside Press, 50. (From now
onwards E, II.)
16. On the interpretative character of perception in Emerson’s thought see the reading offered
by Cavell, especially in his (2004) Cities of Words. A Pedagogical Letter on a Register of the Moral Life,
Cambridge, Harvard University Press. Cavell comments on the idea of perception as
interpretative activity in Emerson, by stressing the presence, in the thought of the American
philosopher,  of  an  ethics  of  perception as  active  and inherently  moral  reality.  Cavell  writes
(Cavell, op. cit.: 389): “A way of summarizing what I take to be Emerson’s criticism of previous
philosophy’s idea of experience – say in Locke and Hume and in Kant – is to reinterpret what it
means to take experience as based upon impressions. These former philosophers classically take
impressions to be the result  of  a  casual  relation borne to me by the world.  In Emerson,  my
impressions are my interpretations of the world, the way I experience the world, the basis of my
judgments of its worth, how it matters to me, impresses me, or not.”








25. This  is  the  view which Stanley  Cavell  has  labeled “epistemology of  the  moods.”  On this
gnoseologic paradigm – traceable in particular in the essay Experience, although appearing in all
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the writings of our author – we are unable to know anything in a direct and immediate fashion,
nor do we get a knowledge of what a thing is in itself; we only get acquainted with a particular
aspect or mode of a given thing.
26. Ivi, 86.
27. As Anna M. Nieddu observes in her introduction to the Italian edition of The Conduct of Life
(Aragno 2008, p. xvi): “Per Ralph Waldo Emerson, fervente ammiratore di Dante Alighieri in terra
americana, l’autentica Vita Nuova si realizza nel momento in cui l’individuo acquista la capacità
di cogliere la presenza della forza spirituale al fondo della bellezza fisica e di misurarsi con un
impulso al rinnovamento, con una forma di apertura attiva e autentica che invita l’individuo a
prendere  in  mano  le  redini  della  propria  esistenza  e  a  condurla  al  di  là  e  oltre  il  mero
appagamento  del  desiderio.  In  questo  atto  risiede  la  realizzazione  di  un  impegno  etico
fondamentale, volto all’auto-determinazione, che è liberazione dalla passività, nella tensione fra
opposte’polarità’,  presa  d’atto  della  incomponibile  compresenza  di  ‘fato’  e  ‘libertà’  al  fondo
dell’operare di ogni individuo, e dell’intera storia dell’uomo” (“For Ralph Waldo Emerson, fervent
admirer of Dante Alighieri in the American land, the authentic New Life actualizes itself precisely
at the time when the individual acquires the capacity to grasp the presence of the spiritual force
underlying physical beauty, and also that of confronting himself with an impulse to renewal,
through a form of active and authentic overture which invites the individual to take the reins of
his own existence and to lead it to another land, beyond the mere satisfaction of the desire. In
this  act  resides the realization of  a  fundamental  ethical commitment,  bent towards the self-
determination, which is a rescue from passivity, in the tension between opposed ‘polarities,’ in
the  acknowledgment  of  the  irreconcilable  coexistence  of  ‘fate’  and ‘freedom’  underlying  the
acting of each individual and of the whole history of man”).
28. Ralph W. Emerson (1883), The Conduct of Life, Cambridge, The Riverside Press, 9. (From now
onwards CL.)
29. Nieddu writes in her introduction to the Italian edition of The Conduct of Life (cit., p. xvi): “[…]
Anche il multiculturalismo e il connesso pluralismo religioso statunitensi, […] possono, in chiave
emersoniana, venire letti come un ricercato equilibrio armonico tra opposte polarità. A questa
forma di equilibrio, sempre precario e fallibile a causa del mistero che lo circonda, il  filosofo
americano allude negando con determinazione qualsiasi possibile approccio di matrice hegeliana
al problema della storia, qualsiasi connessione, cioè, ad una dialettica conciliatrice che risolva i
contrari in una sintesi superiore” (Even the American multiculturalism and the related religious
pluralism […], in an Emersonian perspective, can be read as a refined harmonic balance between
opposed polarities. At this form of balance, always precarious and fallible due to the mistery that
surrounds it, the American philosopher hints by denying with firmness any possible approach of
Hegelian nature to the problem of history, that is, any connection to a conciliatory dialectics able







36. Cfr. the essay Domestic Life, included in Society and Solitude. The essay represents an interesting
attempt to shift the scientific and moral attention from the chief historical-political systems to
the family, domestic life. It is, at the same time, some sort of self-analysis undertaken by Emerson
starting from the observation of one of his children. This essay consists in one of the very first
attempts to draw a philosophy of the household and of the “inhabiting.”
37. Ralph W. Emerson (1883), Society and Solitude, Cambridge, The Riverside Press, 105. (From now
onwards SS..
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44. B. Soressi (2004), Ralph Waldo Emerson. Il pensiero e la solitudine, Roma, Armando editore, 74.
45. SS, 172.
46. Ivi, 173.
47. B. Soressi, op. cit., 76.
48. CL, 58.
49. Ibid.




54. B. Soressi, op. cit., 105.
55. Ivi, 103.








64. Charles S. Peirce, The Monist, 15:2 (April 1905), 161-81.
65. CL, 151.
66. Ivi, 152.
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